Faith and Philosophy

402

and parts of his chapter would be thematically at home in Book II of Paradise Lost. How, morally, should a Christian respond to a view like this? I’m
not sure. Maybe the usual analytic approach is enough. But I found myself
hoping that, as the literature on the axiology of theism expands, part of
it will address the research ethics appropriate to the investigation. (I’m
grateful to Liz Jackson for comments on an earlier version of this review.)
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CHRIS TWEEDT, Christopher Newport University
In Faith and Humility, Jonathan Kvanvig argues for an account of two virtues that balance, or provide correction for, each other: faith and humility.
Faith is the disposition to act in service of an ideal, a disposition that remains despite difficulties or setbacks. One can, however, pursue distorted
ideals or pursue them in the wrong way—with unquestioning zeal, for
example. Humility, which helps to correct this extreme, is the disposition
to attend to the value of one’s aims and the extent of one’s contribution
toward accomplishing them. To establish these accounts, Kvanvig first
argues for a method that directs his arguments, and he then develops the
accounts as he articulates and responds to alternative views. In what follows, instead of summarizing the book chapter by chapter, I provide a
summary of Kvanvig’s positions and his arguments for them as they are
eventually developed throughout the book.
In the first three-quarters of the book, Kvanvig gives an account of faith.
His aim is to provide an account that applies across both religious and
non-religious contexts by searching for faith worth having, employing an
axiomatic approach rather than engaging in linguistic analysis, etymology, or an effort to discover the fundamental components of the world.
The axiomatic approach, says Kvanvig, is what makes philosophy worth
doing: “We can engage philosophically in an analysis of anything in the
dictionary, but we don’t, and the reason we don’t, when it is justifying of
our practice, is because we presuppose the value or importance or significance of what we focus on in our philosophical explorations” (25).
In the search for faith worth having, Kvanvig assumes that faith is a
virtue, a trait of character that is characterized functionally, and asks what
this trait is for, or why it is worth having. His answer is that faith provides structural unity to a life. Lives of faith are contrasted with lives that
are wantonly disconnected, “just one damn thing after another” (16), or
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lives characterized by changes of direction and loss of heart. Throughout, Kvanvig uses two exemplars of faith: (1) Abraham, who faithfully
left Mesopotamia at God’s command (Genesis 12), and (2) a Little Leaguer
who gives up a game-winning home run and resolves to become a better
pitcher so that it doesn’t happen again. Faith is what explains the behavior
of the exemplars—both have integrated a significant portion of their lives
around a long-term ideal, even if that ideal is insufficiently articulated or
unlikely to be realized.
Kvanvig argues against alternative accounts of faith, the first of which
are cognitive accounts. One such account is that faith is the disposition to
believe truths supported by the evidence, but, Kvanvig says, faith is too
valuable just to be that. In fact, there seems to be no underlying cognitive attitude held by all people of faith, because the exemplars above (and
other people of faith) do not share any cognitive attitude. For example,
Abraham could have acted solely on the hope, rather than the belief, that
God would fulfill his promises. Kvanvig later adds that rational attitudes
are thoroughly perspectival, so we shouldn’t expect there to be a particular
rational attitude that underlies faith. As Kvanvig states, “rationality is always and everywhere sensitive to change in first-person perspective” (73).
One might argue that rationality is not a matter of individual first-person
perspectives but, rather, a God’s-eye perspective, but Kvanvig notes that
a God’s-eye perspective cannot determine what rational attitude a person
should have, because such an attitude would not make sense to individuals with different perspectives. For the reasons above, faith is not a cognitive virtue.
One option not considered by Kvanvig is whether faith is a certain
range of perspectives or construals of the world—perspectives that orient the agent toward what is valuable. These perspectives are, to be sure,
cognitive, and they are certainly worth having; if people act, they act according to how they see value in the world, and such perspective-taking
orients and structures lives. Abraham could have construed the world as
one directed by God without any of the specific beliefs or rational attitudes that Kvanvig mentions, and the Little Leaguer could have construed
the world as one in which his hard work will prevent future losses. Even if
there is not a unique, consistent perspective that constitutes faith, neither
is there one unique, consistent ideal that constitutes faith on Kvanvig’s
view. Perhaps future work could head in this direction.
Kvanvig also argues against alternative non-cognitive views of faith,
specifically against the view that faith is trust and the view that faith is
based on the subject’s preferences. Kvanvig argues that faith is not trust,
first, because it is unclear what trust is—dependence on the goodwill of
another, optimism about the goodwill of another, a decision-theoretic calculation, or a disposition involving normative reactive attitudes. Second,
trust is not necessary for faith, because Abraham could have had severe
trust issues but still acted in faith; in fact, according to Kvanvig, it appears
Abraham did have trust issues (35). Finally, trust is not sufficient for faith,
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because trust can be completely passive whereas faith is a disposition toward action.
Kvanvig’s objection to accounts according to which faith is based on
attitudinal states such as preferences is that these accounts cannot account
for crisis: the agent sometimes cannot compare their preferences for alternate outcomes, because one of the alternatives might involve an event that
is so cataclysmic to matters central to their life that the agent cannot form
preferences about it. This bewilderment might be indicated by Peter when
he had to consider whether to abandon Jesus and asked, in the face of such
a decision, “Where would we go? You have the words of eternal life” (49,
John 6:68). Kvanvig takes the failure of preference-based accounts—Lara
Buchak’s in particular—as a proxy for the failure of other accounts of faith
based on attitudinal states (emotions, hopes, fears, and other preferences)
because Buchak’s view is the most impressive attitudinal-state-based account in the literature and because it has plausible modern-day decision
theory behind it, which gives it an advantage over other attitudinal-statebased accounts (40).
Kvanvig concludes that faith is essentially affective and is compatible
with a multitude of cognitive attitudes, levels of trust, preferences, and so
on, even if those attitudes, trust levels, etc. are ontologically more basic.
Faith is defined as hearts are—functionally, in virtue of pumping blood—
and which are realized by different shapes and materials.
What about religious faith? Doesn’t religious faith involve having particular creedal beliefs? Kvanvig spends a considerable amount of space
discussing religious belief, responding to John Dewey’s account of faith,
undercutting arguments for the view that religious faith involves particular beliefs, and providing an alternative understanding of Christian
Scriptural accounts of faith. Concerning the alternative understanding,
Kvanvig notes, first, that in the Christian Scriptures the term for faith in
Greek is pistis, which is often incorrectly translated as “belief”; we ought
instead to convert New Testament English translations of belief into language of faith. James 2:19, for example, should read, “You have faith that
there is one God. Good! Even the demons have that faith, and shudder”
(116). That James passage would then convey that the disposition to act
in service to an ideal involving one god is insufficient for saving faith.
Kvanvig also notes that the contrast to faith—doubt—is best construed
not as lacking a belief but as wavering or hesitation instead of steadfast
pursuit of the relevant ideal. For example, when Peter walked on water
and began to sink, Jesus’s rebuke, “You of little faith, why did you doubt?”
(Matthew14:31) would be odd were Jesus asking Peter why he didn’t sustain a belief; instead, Peter needed help because he was hesitating. Finally,
Kvanvig avers that faith can be useless or “dead” when it is not expressed,
because faith, as a disposition, can be masked (when factors prevent its
expression), and if it is always masked, it is useless. He adds that if there is
a God who cares about one’s life and faith, the masking possibility is very
improbable if one does, in fact, have faith. The strength and value of one’s
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faith, then, is measured by how resistant it is to being prevented and how
much doubt (read: wavering or hesitation) one has.
Concerning arguments that undercut the view that religious faith involves particular beliefs, Kvanvig argues that if one wishes to defend the
view that a belief is fundamental to the Christian faith (e.g., that Jesus is
God), one must also defend that even the Old Testament saints endorsed
the claim. One could appeal to a generic claim (e.g., that God exists), but
even generic claims require representational content that it is likely not all
the saints had (79). It is better, says Kvanvig, to think that generic claims
are entailed by the cognitive commitments of people of faith rather than
that they are in fact one of the cognitive commitments of people of faith.
One might respond that the Athanasian anathemas reveal that faith requires certain particular commitments. (The Athanasian creed, after many
theological claims, concludes, “This is the catholic faith, which except one
believes truly and firmly, they cannot be saved.”) Kvanvig responds by
making an analogy to parents who sometimes make false and exaggerated claims (“Smoking will give you cancer,” “Snakebites will kill you!”).
These claims are often made without much reflection, and when questioned, parents can easily get impatient and appeal to their own authority.
One can see the history of religion, Christianity in particular, this way—as
people of faith engage in efforts to understand how the world coheres
with their affective features, one should expect those people to adopt positions that do not pass epistemic scrutiny. The central concern of Jesus
is not about belief; it’s about “moving away from a central concern for
self and following him . . . being a follower of Jesus has to do with losing
one’s life rather than seeking it and in terms of servanthood rather than a
pursuit of power, fame, fortune, or even honor and glory . . . it is hard to
see how to fit talk of belief in the modern sense into this picture” (130). In
a slogan, Kvanvig holds that “It is an unnecessary hijacking of Christianity
that makes doctrinal matters central” (200).
The upside to the non-centrality of doctrinal commitment is that it
doesn’t make sense to criticize people of faith for being unreasonable. The
problem of faith and reason is not a problem “any more than there is a
concern about some inherent conflict between European ethnicity and
reason. . . . All [the problem] would show is that there are lots of people
with irrational beliefs, not exactly a shocking revelation and certainly not
a situation in which one might expect some analogue of the New Atheists
to arise, counseling everyone to do whatever they can to rid the world of
European ethnicity” (130). So, it is not only unreasonable to hold that doctrinal matters are central to Christianity; it is also unreasonable to criticize
Christianity on the basis of the unreasonableness of a particular doctrine.
Despite the non-centrality of doctrinal matters, faith can still be misguided. When Kvanvig writes that faith involves integrating one’s life
toward an ideal “worth achieving or pursuing” (27), he means that it is
worth living a life in pursuit of an ideal, not that the ideal is always in itself
valuable. Throughout, Kvanvig maintains that there can be narcissistic or
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distorted faith in the same way there can be courageous acts in service of
detrimental ends. This is a concern for Kvanvig. Faith is a virtue, but the
virtue without restraint can lead to overzealous pursuit of nefarious ideals. Such a concern leads Kvanvig to develop an account of humility in the
last quarter of his book.
Humility, which keeps the overzealous pursuit of nefarious ends in
check, is the disposition to attend to the value of one’s aims and the extent of one’s contribution toward accomplishing them. By reflecting on
one’s own fallibility, one can reevaluate, temper, and realign their aim and
methods of pursuit toward their target.
Kvanvig begins his inquiry into humility by noting that humility is different from modesty. Modesty concerns showiness, and its opposing vice
is vanity, whereas humility concerns one’s estimation of one’s own abilities
or accomplishments, and its opposing vice is pride or arrogance. Kvanvig
then considers the nature of the virtue of humility. He argues that humility does not require ignorance about one’s own accomplishments; in fact,
the opposite is true—one cannot be humble about one’s accomplishments
when one is clueless about what those accomplishments are. Humility
might even be compatible with full knowledge of one’s accomplishments.
Kvanvig also argues against the view that humility requires downplaying
another’s assessment of one’s accomplishments for four reasons: first, it
would be difficult for those who are greatly disadvantaged to be humble;
second, self-awareness is good in itself; third, the only value in such a
virtue is that it is fun to be around such a person, but obsequiousness
would also serve such a purpose; and fourth, one could become competitive about how much they can downplay their own accomplishments,
but to engage in such a competition is not to express humility. Kvanvig
settles on the position that to be humble is to focus attention on one’s own
limitedness and fallibility. Whether or not one is being praised, a humble
person realizes at least one of three aspects of their accomplishments: (1)
good fortune played a role, (2) their accomplishments are less significant
when compared to other acts, and (3) we all possess weaknesses. (The
difference between religious and non-religious humility is just that they
involve a different set of evaluative standards.) By being humble, we are
able to assess ourselves more accurately by evaluating, comparing, and
revising the standards of evaluation we’re using so that we can determine
“whether our hearts and minds have been placed on things that matter,
or whether our cares and concerns are but a chasing after the wind” (203).
Faith without humility can be extreme and distorted. Humility without
faith can lead to diminished efforts. By having faith, someone can integrate their life toward a particular direction, and by being humble, that
person can maintain a healthy focus on their own fallibility to ensure that
their life is headed in the right direction in the right way.
Faith and Humility is important reading for scholars who research faith,
humility, or their application, but it will also be of interest to philosophers
who are interested in how debates in other philosophical areas bear on
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practical matters. The book is replete with applications of what initially
seem to be unrelated philosophical areas to issues pertinent to faith and
humility. For some examples, epistemic contextualism, fallibilism, action
theory, counterfactuals, dispositions/masking/finking, Frege’s puzzle/
opacity of propositional content, Bayesian conditionalization, epistemic
coherentism, the basing relation, analyticity, and the preface paradox are
all brought to bear on issues related to faith and humility. It is my hope
that this integration of other philosophical areas with work on faith and
humility will lead to applied work by specialists in these other fields and
to more widespread work on both faith and humility.

God, Science, and Religious Diversity: A Defense of Theism, by Robert T. Lehe.
Cascade Books, 2018. 188 pages. $25 (paperback).
MICHAEL THUNE, Joliet Junior College
A currently popular belief is that the advances in scientific knowledge
over the last few centuries have demonstrated that science is incompatible with religious belief—the latter counting, at best, as “faith” and not
knowledge. A second currently popular belief is that the existence of a
plurality of different religions, each containing adherents that are sincere and morally upright—and whose characteristic beliefs are matters
of “faith” rather than knowledge—means that it is wrongheaded (to say
the least) to have any intellectual commitment to the truth of a given set
of religious beliefs if this commitment involves thinking that any of the
beliefs found in other religions is false. Robert T. Lehe, in God, Science,
and Religious Diversity, provides an academically rigorous and trenchant
challenge to both of these popular beliefs. The intended audience seems
to be manifold, including religious believers who feel uneasy about their
own commitment to certain religious beliefs in light of their awareness of
the advance of science and of the plurality of religious traditions. But the
book is also for skeptics, who may be surprised by Lehe’s well-articulated
defense of the claim that “modern science is not only compatible with
the existence of God, but . . . favors theism over metaphysical naturalism,
the view that only the natural world exists and that all phenomena are
governed entirely by the laws of physics” (1). While there are many other
books that conjointly address the topics of science and religion, there aren’t
as many that address science and religious diversity as twin challenges
to particular religious belief and whose responses to these challenges are
woven together in a unified, coherent, and compelling way. God, Science,
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